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Endogenous Timing in Pollution Control: 





In the framework of international cooperation on climate change to control greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG), this paper aims to shed new light on the eventuality of the emergence of a country (or a group 
of countries) behaving as a leader in the implementation of its environmental policy. The sequence of 
moves  in  the  existing  literature  is  usually  an  exogenous  assumption,  –  known  as  the  Cournot 
assumption  (if  countries  take  action  simultaneously)  and  the  Stackelberg  assumption  (if  they  act 
sequentially, the latter observing the strategy of the former). The main purpose here is to make the 
timing endogenous. To do so, we introduce a pre-play stage in the basic two-country game. Then we 
provide different sets of minimal conditions – on the benefit and damage functions linked to GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of 
play. While the results essentially confirm the prevalence of the former, they also indicate that the 
latter  are  natural  under  some  robust  conditions:  a  leader  can  emerge  endogenously  when 
implementing its environmental policy. Finally we provide sufficient conditions for a specific leader 
to appear. All the results come with an analysis in terms of global emissions and global welfare. No 
extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence, or uniqueness of equilibria are needed, and the 
analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the “Earth Summit” of Rio de Janeiro in 1992, almost all countries of the world are part of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
2 This Convention recognizes 
the existence of climate change and sets general goals and rules for stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
concentrations. Among its general principles, members of the Convention have agreed to place the 
heaviest burden for fighting climate change on industrialized nations – since they are the source of 
most past and current GHG emissions –, and to develop national programs to slow climate change in 
sectors  such  as  agriculture,  energy,  transportation  and  so  on.  They  also  recognized  that  the 
Convention was a "framework" document that had to be amended or augmented over time so that 
efforts to deal with global warming and climate change can be focused and made more effective.
3,4 
Nevertheless, the current negotiation process is rather long and complex with a permanent risk of 
failure. The distinctive characteristics of the problem turn it into a big challenge. First of all, the 
environment – or the atmosphere, is a global public good that countries are free to provide or to enjoy 
freely.
5 Secondly, States are sovereign and no supranational authority exists to implement a globally 
optimal  environmental  policy:  each  country  has  thus  to  decide  voluntarily  to  reduce  its  GHG 
emissions given a strong incentive to free ride. Finally, even if countries agree on the existence of the 
problem and its urgency, national emissions are a strategic variable since they are linked to national 
economic activities, and thus to economic growth and development.
6 
Actually, two arguments exist for and against a strategy to implement stronger or more lax national 
environmental  policies than  the  others  (Ulph,  2001). Because  countries are linked  through  trade, 
environmental  policies  will  affect  the  international  competitiveness  of  particular  sectors  of  an 
economy. If governments are concerned about this loss of competitiveness, they may set too lax 
environmental policies, essentially as a form of covert protection. An alternative point of view is that 
such strategic trade considerations may also induce governments to set tough environmental policies 
to give their domestic producers a competitive advantage in developing “green” technologies ahead of 
their rivals. In all, an important consideration for a country will be the economic cost of having to set 
tougher environmental policies than at least some other countries.  
Enhancing worldwide economic progress combined with reduced emissions is a rather hard task 
when each country is pursuing its own interest. In this framework, we aim to study the eventuality of 
the emergence of a country or a group of countries acting as a leader in the implementation of its 
                                                    
2 The UNFCCC is an international treaty joined by192 countries around the world. Countries ratifying the treaty 
are called "Parties to the Convention". The Conference of the Parties (COP), as an association of all member 
countries, is the prime authority of the Convention. To know more, see the website http://unfccc.int/2860.php.  
3 To tackle the problem of GHG accumulation in the atmosphere, governments of the world meet annually for a 
period of two weeks. They evaluate the status of climate change and the effectiveness of the treaty.  
4 In 1997, the Convention led in turn to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.  
5 The global character means that there is not a unique well identified and settled agent responsible for GHG 
emissions. Emissions are rather the indirect consequence of the performance of a large group of economies.  
6 Negotiations are also the place to defend national economic interests (given the increasing inter-connexion of 
countries on global markets) and geostrategic positions. 5 
 
environmental  policy.  To  illustrate  our  purpose,  we  note  that  the  last  Conference  of  the  Parties 
(COP15,  Copenhagen,  2010)  has  been  the  occasion  of  intense  discussions  on  United  States  and 
China’s respective GHG emissions: in which respect could we observe the emergence of leading 
behaviour from one of the two largest emitters of the planet? Conversely, the European Union was 
among the most involved in the process to promote cooperation by offering to strongly curb its GHG 
emissions and also trying to initiate an agreement among a more limited number of countries for the 
latter attempt to be more effective.
7 
How can such behaviour be explained? Would it be a sacrifice of the leading country or group to 
implement such a policy? Is there no economic rationale? What would the consequences be at a 
global level (in terms of effectiveness) and what would the strategy adopted by the others be in 
response?  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  shed  light  on  the  economic  circumstances  justifying  such 
behaviour, i.e. leading in  the implementation of one’s national environmental policy. The results 
exposed  are  built  on  the  literature  studying  international  cooperation  on  global  issues  using  non 
cooperative game theory.
8 This tool has shown to be particularly suited to model strategic interactions 
among States. The fundamental model is the one introduced by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and 
called  “the  global  emission  game”  (Finus,  2001).
9  The  game  depicts  the  problem  of  GHG 
accumulation  in  the  atmosphere  and  linked  to  human  activities.  Broadly  speaking,  emissions  are 
viewed  as  an  output  of  the  production  and  consumption  of  goods  from  which  countries  derived 
benefits, while payoff functions describe the net welfare implications from emissions. 
As the game involves only two countries (or two groups), two alternatives exist when considering 
the sequence of moves in the global emission game: a simultaneous and a sequential move version of 
the constituent game. In the former case, countries choose their emission level at the same time 
whereas in the latter, one  country  chooses  first, the  second  mover  observing  the  decision  of the 
former. In the first game, equilibria are called “Cournot-Nash equilibria” while in the second one, 
they are named “Stackelberg equilibria”. Both have been postulated and studied independently in the 
literature. Comparing outcomes of each game yields some differences (Finus, 2001).
10  
Nonetheless, the main drawback of the sequential game is that the order of move is generally 
exogenously attributed to the countries, while the latter are a priori interchangeable. Hence, a general 
                                                    
7 The question on the prospects of seeing a leader emerging in the implementation of its environmental policy 
can also be relevant with respect to other groups: Annex I and non-Annex I countries; signatories and non 
signatories of a potential Post-2012 Kyoto Protocol; or even among OECD members (inside Annex I countries). 
8 Note that cooperation can even emerge in a non cooperative framework (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 
1994; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006 and Heugues, 2009a).  
9 An alternative game is the one in abatement proposed by Hoel (1991) or Barrett (1994). Both games are 
strictly equivalent as soon as countries’ individual emissions are always positive (Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 
2006). 
10 When countries choose their emission level non cooperatively, the country which takes action first, i.e. the 
leader, has an advantage on the second mover, i.e. the follower, with regard to the case where both countries 
take action simultaneously: he can implement its best outcome. Hence, from a single country’s perspective the 
sequential move is clearly preferable, provided he can move first. 6 
 
problem of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept is the motivation of the assumption that one agent (or 
group of agents) moves first, that is, has superior information compared to the follower(s). Another 
point raised by Finus (2001) is that, since each country has an incentive to be the leader, one would 
expect all countries to compete for this position. Therefore, as long as this leader-follower relationship 
is  not  obvious  from  the  investigated  problem  itself,  some  doubts  about  the  reason  for  such  an 
asymmetry remain. If each country assumes the supposed leadership and chooses the corresponding 
emission level, both countries may end up in a situation which cannot be an equilibrium point. Hence, 
it seems plausible to expect that in this case countries are led back to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
One purpose of this paper is to show that the reasoning above is incomplete. Specifically, we have 
to relate the payoff of the simultaneous game with the one of the follower in the sequential move 
game. If there are conditions under which the latter dominates the former, then the sequential global 
emission game becomes the appropriate representation of the game.  
More generally, this paper provides different sets of minimal conditions on the countries’ payoff 
functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play. To do so we 
construct an extended game of the global emission game: we introduce a previous stage to the global 
emission game in which both countries decide simultaneously on the date (“Early” or “Late”) at 
which they want to play the constituent game.
11 If both countries choose the same date, they’ll play 
simultaneously; if the dates are distinct, they’ll play sequentially with the order announced. Note that, 
in the second stage, countries choose their own emission level and fulfil any commitments made in 
the first stage. We thus assume that countries can commit.
12 While our findings essentially confirm 
the predominance of the simultaneous game, they also indicate that the sequential game under perfect 
information is natural under some robust conditions. The key determinant of the analysis is the nature 
of the interactions between countries.
13 
Finally, the results established in the paper rely on the theory of supermodular games. By this 
approach, no assumptions such as concavity of payoffs, existence or uniqueness of equilibria are 
needed and it lets us extend the usual framework of the literature. 
14, 15 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  extended  global 
emission game. Section 3 defines the solution concepts as well as the conditions of their existence. In 
section  4,  the  main  results  together  with  their  interpretation  are  presented.  Section  5  concludes. 
                                                    
11 This procedure is drawn from the literature on industrial organization. See Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) or 
Amir and Grilo (1999) in the case of a duopoly game. 
12 Other assumptions on countries’ capability to commit would lead to other results with certainty (Boadway et 
al., 2007). An extension would be to consider the consequences of only one country being able to commit.  
13 The global emission game can be seen as a reduced form of the framework in Copeland and Taylor (2005) 
justifying to consider both kinds of interactions: substitutable and complementary. This point is also developed 
in Barrett (2003, 2005). 
14 The approach can be applied in both cases of strategic complementarity and substitutability as the game 
considered is a two-player game.  
15 In more to Appendix A, the interested reader can refer to Amir (2005), Topkis (1998), Vives (1999) or 
Cooper (1999) to have a larger view on the interest of this mathematical tool in economics. 7 
 
Appendix A contains a summary of the lattice-theoretic notions we rely on, whereas Appendix B 
provides all the proofs and some intermediate results.  
2.  The extended global emission game  
The game we consider in this section aims at determining the conditions under which a leader can 
emerge endogenously in the implementation of its national environmental policy. Until now to the 
best of our knowledge, this kind of behaviour has always been postulated exogenously in the referred 
literature.
16  Instead,  we  introduce  the  possibility  for  countries  to  choose  their  position  in  the 
constituent game – named “the global emission game” (Finus, 2001). The game as a whole – hereafter 
named “the extended global emission game” – is a two-country, two-stage game.
17 The timing is such 
that in the first stage, both countries decide simultaneously and independently the date they want to 
play in the second stage: “Early” or “Late”. In the second stage, countries play the global emission 
game, i.e. choose their individual emission level, maximising a payoff function defined below.
18  
Formally, consider two countries not necessarily identical such that i = 1, 2 and N = 2. Linked to 
economic activities, each of them emits GHGs that mix uniformly in the atmosphere. We note x and y 
respectively as the emission levels of Country 1 and of Country 2.  [ ] i i K X , 0 =  stands for the strategy 
set of country i and is a compact interval of the reals. Ki accounts for a capacity constraint in terms of 
pollution.  It  means that  country  i  cannot infinitely  produce GHG  emissions or that its  economic 
activities are bounded. In its most general form, the payoff function of country i, fi, i = 1, 2, is 
expressed as the difference between the benefits of its own emissions, Bi( ), and the damages linked to 
global emissions, Di( ).
19 Then countries 1 and 2 respectively have payoffs: 
) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 y x D x B y x f + − =   and  ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 2 2 y x D y B y x f + − = . 
To  establish  our  results,  we  assume  throughout  that  Bi(·)  and  Di(·)  are  twice  continuously 
differentiable and non decreasing, i = 1, 2. The assumption of differentiable payoff functions is only 
made to simplify the analysis. Given the choice made in the first stage of the extended game by both 
countries, the second stage game is played simultaneously or sequentially:  
i)  If both countries choose the same date, the global emission game is then played 
simultaneously: each country determines its emission level given the emission level of the 
other. The resulting pure strategies Nash equilibria are named “Cournot-Nash equilibria”; 
                                                    
16 Seminal works assume for example that a country has a greater environmental consciousness than the other 
(Finus,  2001;  Pereau  et  al.,  2002);  or  in  the  literature  on  international  environmental  cooperation,  that  the 
coalition  of  signatories  holds  more  information  than  the  non  signatories  (Barrett,  1994;  Diamantoudi  and 
Sartzetakis, 2006). 
17 We call it “the extended global emission game” as we introduce a pre-play stage to the global emission game. 
18 The sequence of moves supposes that both countries can commit to their announcement in the first stage. 
19 Emissions in a country generate an externality causing environmental damage in this country but also in the 
other. The damage function traduces both the public good character and the global character of the environment. 8 
 
ii)  If the dates chosen differ, then the global emission game becomes a two-stage game of 
perfect information. The constituent game is played sequentially with the order of moves 
as announced: the country announcing to play “Early” chooses its emission level first, 
whereas the other (announcing “Late”) chooses its emission level observing the decision 
of the former. In this case, the underlying equilibrium concept is the one of “Stackelberg 
equilibrium”.
20 
Figure 1 below displays the extensive form of the associated game. Here e and l stand for “Early” 
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Figure 1: Extensive form of the extended global emission game.
21 
 
Figure 2 below displays the strategic form of the extended game. Notations are as follows: for i = 1, 
2, let fi
L and fi
F respectively stand for the equilibrium payoffs of the leader and of the follower, 
whereas fi
CN stands for the equilibrium payoff of a country when both choose the same date in the 
preliminary stage.  
Country 2 
    Early (e)  Late (l)   




F   




CN   
 
Figure 2: Strategic form of the extended global emission game. 
 
                                                    
20 Strictly speaking, i) this case implies that the second stage of the extended game consists of two sub-stages; 
ii) the equilibrium concept of the sequential game is the one of subgame perfect equilibrium but the term of 
Stackelberg equilibrium is used to stay conform to the terminology of the literature. 
21 The dotted lines mean that strategy sets in the constituent game are compact intervals of IR+ 9 
 
Either if both countries choose to determine their emission level sooner or to postpone this decision, 
the  equilibrium  payoffs  of  the  simultaneous  game  do  not  change:  time  does  not  matter  when 
determining the payoffs. Note also that a country may not unilaterally choose to be a leader or a 
follower, though he may elect not to be the latter simply by deciding to move in the first period in the 
preliminary stage. Moreover, the situation in which both countries choose their first mover optimal 
action can never be an equilibrium outcome of the extended game. 
Hence, instead of considering both simultaneous and sequential games independently, this 
extension of the global emission game allows capturing the notion of endogenous timing. The 
subgame  perfect  equilibria  (SPE)  of  the  extended  game  thus  induce  an  endogenous 
sequencing of moves in the original game. Consideration is restricted to the SPE in pure 
strategies only. They arise from the comparison of equilibrium payoffs of the simultaneous 
game with those of the sequential game when a country is the leader and when he is the 
follower.  All  the  cases  that  can  arise  are  summed  up  in  Proposition  0  below.  The 
characterization of the SPE is very general in that the uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash and 
Stackelberg  equilibria  for  the  constituent  game  is  not  postulated.  As  we  do  not  assume 
continuity of the best responses, the fact that each country prefers being a leader than a 
simultaneous player at equilibrium needs to be included as an assumption in our setting.
22  
For the given two-country constituent game, let C
N denote the set of Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
strategies and Si denote the set of Stackelberg equilibrium strategies with country i as the leader. 
Finally let E denote the set of SPE of the extended game. With a slight abuse of notation, each 
element of E will be written as a pair of timing announcements and a sequential or simultaneous play 
of the constituent game. For example  { }
N C e e E ), , ( =  means that both countries choose to act early 
leading them to produce one of their Cournot-Nash equilibrium emission levels in the constituent 
game. 
   
                                                    
22 This assumption is not restrictive as the global emission game belongs to the class of games for which this 
assertion is always satisfied (Amir and Grilo, 1999). 10 
 
Proposition 0: 
Consider the two-country game with  φ ≠
N C  and  φ ≠ i S , i = 1, 2. When each country i is better off 
at any point in Si than at any point in C
N, the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the 
extended game is such that:  
a)  If country i’s payoff is strictly higher at his least preferred point in C
N than at every point in 
Sj, i j ≠ for j, i = 1, 2, then { }
N C e e E ), , ( = . 
b)  If country i’s payoff is strictly higher at any point in Sj than at his most preferred point in C
N, 
i = 1, 2, then { } { } 2 1 ), , ( ), , ( S e l S l e E ∪ = . 
c)  If countries are such that, for example Country 1 is as in a) and Country 2 is as in b), then
{ } 1 ), , ( S l e E= . 
Proposition 0 confirms that even if both countries always prefer to be a leader, a solution of the 
simultaneous game does not necessarily emerge: we also need to compare the payoff of the follower 
with regard to the one of the simultaneous game.
23 Given the three cases of Proposition 0 (a, b and c), 
we have to establish the conditions under which a country prefers its payoff as a follower to the one as 
a simultaneous player, i.e. f 
F < [>] f 
CN. To do so, the next section characterizes the set of Cournot-
Nash equilibria of the simultaneous constituent game and the set of Stackelberg equilibria of the 
sequential constituent game. 
3.  Definition, existence and characterization of equilibria in the 
constituent game  
This section defines and characterizes the set of equilibria of the global emission game first when 
both countries choose their emission level simultaneously and when they choose it sequentially under 
perfect information. The characterization will rely on the sign of the cross partial derivative of payoff 
functions:  if  positive  the  objective  reflects  strategic  complementarities  and  if  negative  it  reflects 
strategic substitutes. In each case we show that at least one pure strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium in 
the simultaneous game and at least one Stackelberg equilibrium in the sequential constituent game 
always exist. 
3.1 Definition of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria 
Formally, in the simultaneous game, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a pair (x
N, y
N) such that, for all 
0 , ≥ y x , ) , ( ) , ( 1 1
N N N y x f y x f ≥   and ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 y x f y x f
N N N ≥ .  In  equilibrium  no  country  has  the 
incentive to deviate given the strategy of the other. 
In the sequential game under perfect information, i.e. the follower observes the action of the leader 
before acting, a pure strategy for the leader (e.g. Country 1) is the choice x ≥ 0, and a strategy for the 
                                                    
23 Proposition 0 is only a translation of the Nash equilibria of the extended game. 11 
 
follower is the mapping [ ] [ ] K K g , 0 , 0 : → . Any Stackelberg equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the two-stage game, i.e. a pair  )) ( , ( ⋅
S S g x  such that: 
i)  , 0 )) ( , ( )) ( , ( 1 1 ≥ ∀ ≥ x x g x f x g x f
S S S S   
ii)  . 0 ) , ( )) ( , ( 2 2 ≥ ∀ ≥ y y x f x g x f
S S S S  
Any  Stackelberg  equilibrium  is  such  that  ) , (
S S y x   lies  on  the  follower’s  best  response 
correspondence defined by ) , ( max arg ) ( 2 0 2 y x f x br y≥ = . Moreover there is no x ≥ 0,
S x x ≠ such that
) ( ), , ( ) , ( 2 1 1 x br y y x f y x f
S S ∈ ∀ > . It means that there is no emission level other than x
S leading to 
a higher payoff level for the leader. The leader when choosing its equilibrium emission level in the 
first stage takes into account the second stage best response of the follower  ) ( 2 x br  in its objective 
function. The game is then solved by backward induction. Through this equilibrium strategy, the 
problem of maximization of the follower does not change with regard to the situation where both 
countries choose simultaneously. 
In what follows we characterize the set of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of the global 
emission  game  given  the  assumptions  on  the  benefit  and  damage  functions.  Only  pure  strategy 
equilibria are taken into account.  
3.2 Existence and characterisation of equilibria in each subgame 
We now define the conditions under which the sets of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are 
non empty. The analysis relies on the sign of the cross partial derivative of a country’s payoff function 
in its strategy x and in the strategy of the other y: if negative, a country’s strategies are substitutable; if 
positive, a country’s strategies are complement. The former case means that a country does more as 
the other does less (negative feedback); the latter means that a country does more as the other does 
more (positive feedback) (Barrett, 2003).
24 This sign is the key determinant of the overall analysis: 
given this sign, equilibrium behaviours and payoffs change. From now on, the analysis relies on two 
minimal and strictly distinct sets of assumptions on the benefit and damage functions. We expose 
them and then explain them (the details on the mathematical definition are exposed in Appendix B).   
Assumptions under A1: 
-  The damage function Di(·), (i = 1, 2) is strictly convex, 0 , ≥ ∀ y x and  
-  [ ] i i K Z , 0 ∈ ∃  such that  Z Z D Z B Z D Z B i i i i i i ∀ − ≤ − ), ( ) ( ) ( ) (  (i = 1, 2). 
   
                                                    
24 The limit case is when the cross partial derivative is null: countries’ strategies are independent, i.e. as a 
country does more/less, the other does nothing (no feedback). 12 
 
Assumptions under A2: 
-  The damage function Di(·), (i = 1, 2) is strictly concave, 0 , ≥ ∀ y x and
25 
-  The benefit function Bi(·), (i = 1, 2) is strictly concave, 0 , ≥ ∀ y x . 
Under the set denoted A1, a country’s strategies are strategic substitutes and best responses are 
strictly decreasing in the strategy of the other. In fact the strict convexity of the damage function 
(damages increase at an increasing rate) yields to payoff functions with strictly decreasing differences 
in (x, y) whatever the assumption on the benefit function. The definition of i Z lets us express the best 
response of country i when the other pollute 0.  
Under the set A2, a country’s strategies are strategic complements and best responses are strictly 
increasing in the strategy of the other. The strict concavity of the damage function (damages increase 
at a decreasing rate) insures that payoff functions have strictly increasing differences in (x, y). The 
strict concavity of the benefit function is needed to insure global consistency between individual and 
global emission levels (Heugues, 2009b).
26 
The next proposition presents the minimal conditions under which C
N is non empty when both 
countries’ strategies are substitutable. In this case, the use of lattice theory is appropriate only because 
the number of agents is limited to two. To use it, we consider for one country the opposite sign on its 
strategy set (Amir, 2005). For example if Country 2 chooses the emission level –y instead of y, 
decreasing differences in (x, y) become increasing differences in (x, –y). This kind of argument cannot 
be generalized to games with more than two agents.
27 
Proposition 1: 
Under the set of assumptions A1, the two-country global emission game is a supermodular game with 
the order reversal on the strategy set of one country, and C
N is non empty. 
The strict convexity of the damage function alone yields to payoff functions with strictly decreasing 
differences in (x, y). To establish the existence of an equilibrium, we can distinguish two sub-cases 
relying on the form of the benefit function. If the latter is concave, countries’ strategies are weakly 
substitutable  (the slope  of  the  best  responses is  strictly  less  than one in  absolute  terms) and the 
equilibrium is unique.
28 On the contrary, if the benefit function is convex, countries’ strategies are 
strongly substitutable (best responses are strongly decreasing with a slope greater than one in absolute 
terms) and payoff functions are not anymore necessarily concave. In this case, the second assumption 
in the set A1 ensures the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium in which one country has positive 
                                                    
25 The empirical literature on the evaluation of the impacts of climate change has recognized the importance of 
non linearities in the climate change issue (Ortiz and Markandya, 2009). On way to do it is to consider a S-
shaped damage function (Dumas and Ha-Duong, 2005). 
26 As z = x + y, if x and y are mutually increasing, z must be increasing as well. 
27 See Vives (1999) for an alternative argument leading to the same conclusions. 
28 The proof is immediate because of the concavity of the payoff function. This case is one of the most exploited 
in the literature quoted above because of this nice mathematical property. 13 
 
emissions, the rival producing no emission (Heugues, 2009b). The following corollary to Proposition 
1 aims at characterizing the Cournot-Nash equilibria of the game under the set of assumptions A1.    
Corollary 1: 
Under the set of assumptions A1, the extreme selections of the best-response correspondence bri( ) are 
non  increasing  in  the  rival’s  emissions.  Hence,  C
N  includes  the  point  ) , ( y x where  Country  1 
[Country  2]  chooses  its  highest  [lowest]  emission  level  in  C
N.  Furthermore,  this  point  lies  on 
) ( min ) ( 2 2 ⋅ = ⋅ br br and is Country 2’s least preferred Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
When  countries’  strategies  are  substitutable  and  N  =  2,  a  Cournot-Nash  equilibrium  in  pure 
strategies always exists. The aim of Corollary 1 is to define an order on the preferences of each 
country. A direct consequence of the set of assumptions A1 is that best responses are decreasing. In 
considering  the  opposite  sign  on  the  strategy  set  of  Country  2,  we  can  establish  that  the  set  of 
Cournot-Nash equilibria has a smallest and a highest element. The highest element is  ) , ( y x and it is 
the highest equilibrium for Country 1, i.e. providing him the highest payoff of the simultaneous game. 
This equilibrium is also the least preferred by Country 2. We can also define the point  ) , ( y x as the 
smallest element in the set of Cournot-Nash equilibria and yielding to the highest payoff for Country 
2 and the smallest payoff for Country 1. 
With Proposition 2 and its corollary, we proceed as well to establish the conditions of existence of 
any Cournot-Nash equilibrium when countries’ strategies are complementary. In this case the use of 
the theorems of the theory of supermodular games is direct. 
Proposition 2: 
Under the set of assumptions A2, the global emission game is supermodular with the natural order on 
countries’ strategy sets, and C
N is non empty. 
If individual emission levels (x and y) are increasing, the global emission level (z) must also be 
increasing. Here the global consistency of the game is provided by the strict concavity of the benefit 
functions. Under the set of assumptions A2, we can provide the following corollary to Proposition 2.  
Corollary 2: 
Under the set of assumptions A2, the extreme selections of the best response correspondence bri( ) are 
non  decreasing  in  the  rival’s  emissions.  Hence,  the  smallest  Cournot-Nash  equilibrium  ) , ( y x  
belongs to C
N and both countries prefer it to all other Cournot-Nash equilibria.  
Under  A2,  the  global  emission  game  is  naturally  a  supermodular  game  and  best  response 
correspondences are strictly increasing. The set of equilibria of the simultaneous game is thus non 
empty and has a smallest and a highest element Pareto ordered. In this case, the most preferred 14 
 
equilibrium for the countries (i.e. leading to the highest payoffs) is the one where both choose their 
lowest  emission  level ) , ( y x .  On  the  contrary,  the  equilibrium  point ) , ( y x   provides  the  lowest 
payoffs of the simultaneous game. This relation between emission levels and equilibrium payoffs is 
linked to the nature of the externalities – negative, generated by countries’ strategic behaviours.  
Let  us  now  characterize  the  set  of  Stackelberg  equilibria  through  Proposition  3.  With 
respect to the works of Hellwig and Leininger (1987), this set is non empty independently of 
the sets of assumptions A1 and A2.
29  
Proposition 3: 
Under the set of assumptions A1 [respectively A2], the set of Stackelberg equilibrium strategies with 
country i as leader is such that { } ) ( ) , ( : ) , ( max arg 0 ⋅ ∈ = ≥ j i xi i br GR y x y x f S . Hence, every point in Si 
gives the leader the same payoff, which is at least as high as his best Cournot-Nash payoff. 
By Proposition 3, any Stackelberg equilibrium lies on the lowest best response correspondence of 
the follower. Moreover, even if the leader has several strategies maximizing its payoff, we can always 
assume the uniqueness (its payoff function being continuous in the strategy of the follower): if there is 
a multitude of equilibria for the leader, he can always choose the emission level  yielding to the 
highest  payoff  for  her.  Furthermore  given  Corollaries  1  and  2,  the  most  preferred Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium always lies on the lowest best response correspondence of the rival. As the leader can 
always choose its preferred equilibrium emission level which lies on the same correspondence, it 
follows that any strategy for the leader brings him a payoff at least as high as the one he receives at 
the equilibrium of the simultaneous game. 
Given  the  equilibria  of  the  simultaneous  and  of  the  sequential  games,  we  now  compare  the 
associated payoffs to establish the SPE of the extended game.    
4.  Results : Subgame perfect equilibria of the extended game and 
their respective environmental consequences  
This section determines the conditions under which both countries choose the same position in the 
global  emission  game  and  those  under  which  the  positions  chosen  differ.  The  choice  for  one 
alternative is directly linked to the nature of the interactions between the countries. So the following 
propositions strongly rely  on the existence results of the previous section. In each case, we also 
discuss the environmental impact of countries’ strategic behaviours with regard to the alternative not 
chosen. The next proposition provides the conditions under which the endogenous determination of 
the sequence of choices yields to the simultaneous game and thus to one Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  
                                                    
29 The authors establish that, for compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions, Stackelberg equilibria 
always exist and Stackelberg equilibrium strategy sets (Si, i = 1, 2) are non empty. These conditions are true 
under both sets of assumptions A1 and A2. 15 
 
Proposition 4: 
Under the set of assumptions A1, assume that no Cournot-Nash equilibrium lies on a boundary (i.e. 
with one emission level being 0). Then the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the extended 
game is such that { }
N C e e E ), , ( = . 
When countries’ strategies are substitutable, the sole outcome of the extended game is the one in 
which the countries act simultaneously. The reason is twofold: both countries prefer their payoff as 
the leader and second, they will do all that is possible not to be the follower. The reason is that their 
payoff as the follower is always below the one they can get at any Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
30  
From an environmental impact point of view, this case is the most difficult to interpret. It appears 
through the proof of Proposition 4 that the leader would have higher emissions, whereas the follower 
would have lower emissions with regard to the solution of the simultaneous game. The conclusion on 
the environmental impact of this SPE thus depends on the strength of the substitutability between 
countries’ strategies. Two cases are relevant: substitutability is weak or substitutability is strong.
31 
The solution of the simultaneous game is preferable from a global point of view (to the sequential 
one) when countries’ strategies are weakly substitutable: the SPE of Proposition 4 leads to a lower 
global equilibrium emission level than if a leader were to emerge because in this case, an increase of 
emissions by the leader would not be compensated by the decrease of emissions by the follower.  
This  assertion  becomes  false  when  countries’  strategies  are  strongly  substitutable  and  the 
equilibrium is interior: in this case, an increase of emissions by the leader would now be completely 
compensated by the decrease of emissions by the follower. Therefore the SPE of Proposition 4 is not 
anymore the most favourable outcome from a global point of view when countries’ strategies are 
strongly substitutable. 
The following proposition provides the conditions under which the endogenous determination of the 
sequence of choices yields to one of the sequential modes of play: if a country chooses to play first in 
the first stage, the other will choose to play second and vice versa. These conditions lead to the 
emergence of a leader in the global emission game.  
Proposition 5: 
Under the set of assumptions A2, the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the extended game is 
such that { } { } 2 1 ), , ( ), , ( S e l S l e E ∪ = .  
When countries’ strategies are complementary, the solution of the extended game is such that one of 
the two leader-follower configurations emerges. The reason is that even if both countries prefer their 
payoff as the leader, their payoff at any Cournot-Nash equilibrium is always lower than the one a 
                                                    
30 For strictly positive emission levels (the equilibrium is interior), we show in Appendix B that the sets of 
Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are always distinct (See Lemma B.1). 
31 Each case depends on the assumption on the benefit functions (cf. the discussion following Proposition 1) 16 
 
country gets as the follower. Consequently if Country 1 anticipates that Country 2 will choose to act 
first, he will act second and vice versa.
32 
Another striking point is that the individual equilibrium emission levels of the sequential game are 
below those of the simultaneous game: both countries choose to reduce their emission level with 
regard to the Pareto dominant emission levels of the simultaneous game. Therefore the position of 
leadership does not necessarily mean that the leader will increase its emissions to the detriment of the 
follower. As the strategies are complementary, the feedback is positive and both countries reduce their 
individual emission level. We can thus conclude without any ambiguity that the SPE of the extended 
game underlined by Proposition 5 is the best outcome from an environmental point of view with 
regard to the simultaneous one. 
The fact remains that a limit to Proposition 5 is that both leader-follower configurations can emerge. 
The proposition cannot endogenously explain why a country should be a leader or a follower. The 
following proposition provides sufficient conditions under which a specific leader emerges in the 
global emission game.  
Proposition 6: 
Consider for example that Country 1’s payoff function checks the set of assumptions A1 and that 
Country 2’s payoff function checks the set of assumptions A2. If an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
exists,  then  the  set  of  subgame  perfect  Nash  equilibria  of  the  extended  game  is  such  that
{ } 1 ), , ( S l e E = .  
When the nature of the interactions between the countries differs, Proposition 6 lets us conclude that 
the leader is the country whose payoff function presents strategic substitutability. Given Proposition 4, 
we know that such a country will do all he can not to be the follower. Therefore the strategy “Late” in 
the first stage of the extended game is strictly dominated for Country 1. On the contrary the country 
whose payoff function exhibits strategic complementarities always prefers to be a follower, instead of 
the  outcome  where  both  countries  take  action  simultaneously  (See  Proposition  5).  In  this 
configuration, strategic behaviours of both countries are well matched and a specific leader emerges.  
Note that in this case, we need to assume the existence of an equilibrium point in the simultaneous 
game. As best response correspondences are not necessarily continuous, it’s possible that no Cournot-
Nash equilibrium exists; but if there exists one, it’s necessarily unique. This point is linked to the fact 
that  best  response  strategies  progress  in  opposite  directions  (the  one  of  Country  1  is  strictly 
decreasing, whereas the one of Country 2 is strictly increasing). A sufficient condition to guarantee 
the existence of such an equilibrium point is that the payoff functions are quasi concave in their own 
strategy: this assumption ensures continuous best response strategies that necessarily intersect. 
                                                    
32 For strictly positive emission levels, Lemma B.2 in Appendix B shows that the sets of Cournot-Nash and 
Stackelberg equilibria are always distinct. 17 
 
The  last  result  is  also  interesting  when  considering  the  environmental  impact  of  countries’ 
strategies. This configuration is such that the leader as well as the follower reduce their emission level 
with regard to the simultaneous case, yielding a lower aggregated emission level and thus a better 
environment. 
5.  Conclusion 
The paper confirms the widespread perception that the Stackelberg concept is unsuitable under the 
usual assumptions of the global emission game, i.e. when countries’ strategies are substitutable. In 
this case, each country has an incentive to be the leader (and certainly not a follower), and both are led 
back to one of the Cournot-Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game. Thus considering the existence 
of negative leakages between countries’ economic activities – as postulated in the existing literature 
on international cooperation to control GHG emissions, no country or group should emerge as a 
leader in the implementation of its environmental policy. 
Nonetheless  conditions  yielding  to  sequential  outcomes  also  exist:  a  leader  can  emerge 
endogenously. These cases are those in which the payoff function of one or both countries exhibits 
strategic complementarities. A striking point under these circumstances is that both the leader and the 
follower  reduce  their  individual  emissions  with  respect  to  the  simultaneous  alternative.  From  an 
economic point of view, it means that a country (or a group) can choose to implement a stronger 
national environmental policy than the others. In this prospect, he will be followed by the others: they 
will reduce as well their emissions even if not necessarily as much as the leader. A second mover 
advantage can also appear depending on the strength of the interactions between countries. Hence, if 
reinforcement effects exist between countries’ economic activities (because of increasing return to 
scale, transfers of technologies, imitation), we should observe the emergence of a country (or a group) 
leading in the implementation of its environmental policy.   
Finally, the set of propositions in this paper relies on minimal assumptions, including the absence of 
technical  ones,  such  as  concavity  of  payoffs  and  uniqueness  of  Cournot-Nash  and  Stackelberg 
equilibria. Hence, a sufficient condition for our analysis is the one of global monotony of the best 
responses. For all the cases studied, the interiority assumptions are needed only to ensure that both 
equilibrium  concepts  do  not  coincide.  This  allows  us  to  provide  clear  predictions  on  countries’ 
behaviours  in  the  extended  global  emission  game  and  ensures  that  sequential  and  simultaneous 
outcomes are not equilibria at the same time.  
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Appendix A: Definitions and main theorems of lattice theory 
Definitions and theorems introduce in this appendix are only a simplified version of the ones of lattice 
theory. We take the parameter and action sets, respectively T and X, to be compact subsets of IR, and 
Xt a correspondence from T to X, with Xt being the set of feasible actions when the parameter is t. 
 
Definition A.1: 
A function IR T X f → × :  has [strictly] increasing differences in (x, t) if for all x x ≥ ′  and t t ≥ ′ :
[ ] ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t x f t x f t x f t x f − ′ > ≥ ′ − ′ ′ . 
 
Lemma A.1 (see Amir, 2003, p. 5 for the proof):  
If f is twice continuously differentiable, f has [strictly] increasing differences in (x, t) if and only 
[ ]0 / ) , (
2 > ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂ t x t x f  for all x and t. 
 
For functions defined on IR
2, increasing differences is equivalent to supermodularity, so the two terms 
can be used interchangeably.  
 
Definition A.2: 
A function IR X f → :  is upper semi-continuous in x0 if  ) ( ) ( sup lim 0 0 x f x f x x ≤ → . A function f is upper 
semi-continuous if it is for all X x ∈ 0 . 
 
Definition A.3: 
For + ∈ R t , let [ ] + ⊂ = R t h t g Xt ) ( ), ( , with ) (⋅ g and  ) (⋅ h being real valued functions and with g ≤ h. 
Xt is ascending [descending] in t if  ) (⋅ g and  ) (⋅ h are increasing [decreasing] in t. 
 
A non cooperative game is a triple (N, Xi, fi) consisting of a non empty set of players N, a set Xi of 




= × 1 for each player i in N.  
 
Definition A.4: 
A non-cooperative game (N, Xi, fi) is a supermodular game if each set Xi of feasible strategies is a 
compact set of the Euclidian space and if each payoff function  ) , ( i i i x x f −  is upper semi-continuous 
in xi and has increasing differences in (xi, xj) for all players  N j i ∈ , and  j i ≠ .  
 
Lemma A.2 (Topkis, 1998, chapter 4): 
The set of all equilibrium points for a non cooperative game (N, Xi, fi) is identical to the set of fixed 
points for the best joint response correspondence, i.e. the direct product of players’ individual best 




i br . 
 
Theorem A.1 (Topkis, 1978): 
If  IR T X f → × :  is upper semi-continuous and has increasing [decreasing] differences in (x, t), and 
Xt  is  ascending  [descending]  in  t,  then  the  maximum  and  minimum  selections  of 
) , ( max arg ) ( * t x f t x Xt x∈ = are increasing [decreasing] in t. If f has strictly increasing [decreasing] 
differences in (x, t), then the conclusion of theorem holds for every selection of x*(·). 
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Theorem A.2 (Topkis, 1979): 
If IR T X f → × :  is upper semi-continuous in x for each t, and f has increasing differences in (x, t) 
then: (i) ) , ( max arg ) ( t x f t x X x∈ =  is non empty and possess maximal and minimal selections,  ) (t x  
and  ) (t x   for  all  t;  (ii)  maximal  and  minimal  selections  of  x(t)  are  increasing  functions  of  t. 
Furthermore, if f has strictly increasing differences in (x, t), then every selection of x(t) is increasing.  
 
Theorem A.3 (Tarsky, 1955): 
Let  X  be  an  non  empty  and  compact  interval  of  the  Euclidian  space  and  let X X f → : be  an 
increasing function ( ) ( ) ( y f x f ≤  if  y x ≤ ). Then the set of fixed points of f is non empty and 
contains a smallest and a largest element in X. 
 
Theorem A.4 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990): 
Let  * x  and  * x denote the smallest and largest elements of X, and suppose y and z are two equilibria 
with z y ≥ . (1) If  ) , ( i i i x x f −  is increasing in x-i, then  ) ( ) ( z f y f i i ≥ . (2) If  ) , ( i i i x x f −  is decreasing 
in x-i, then ) ( ) ( z f y f i i ≤ . If the condition in (1) holds for some subset of players N1 and the condition in 
(2) holds for the remainder N\N1, then the largest equilibrium is the most preferred equilibrium for 
the players in N1, and the least preferred for the remaining players. The smallest equilibrium is the 
least preferred by the players in N1, and the most preferred by the remaining players. 
Appendix B: Proofs 
This appendix contains the proofs of propositions made in the text. We also introduce intermediate 
results (Lemma B.1 and B.2) that are useful building blocks to simplify proofs of Propositions 4, 5 
and 6. Propositions 1 and 2 and their respective corollaries (Corollary 1 and 2) provide the conditions 
under which the two country game possesses at least one pure strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium (C
N 
non  empty)  and  characterize  properties  of  equilibria  given  the  nature  of  interactions  between 
countries. Proposition 3 does the same for Stackelberg equilibria (Si non empty, i = 1, 2). Finally, by 
comparing equilibrium payoffs, we can conclude on the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the 
extended game (Propositions 4, 5 and 6). 
 
Reminder:  
-  The functions  + + → IR IR B :  and  + + → IR IR D :  are twice continuously differentiable and non 
decreasing. The analysis is split into two distinct sets of assumptions:  
o  Under A1, the damage function Di(·), (i = 1, 2) is strictly convex, 0 , ≥ ∀ y x and [ ] i i K Z , 0 ∈ ∃  
such that Z Z D Z B Z D Z B i i i i i i ∀ − ≤ − ), ( ) ( ) ( ) (  (i = 1, 2): countries’ strategies are substitutable;  
o  Under A2, both the benefit function Bi(·), (i = 1, 2) and the damage function Di(·), (i = 1, 2) are 
strictly concave: countries’ strategies are complement. 
-  C
N,  Si  and  E  denote  respectively  the  set  of  Cournot-Nash  equilibrium  strategies,  the  set  of 
Stackelberg equilibrium strategies with player i as leader and the set of SPE of the extended game 
(in no case, uniqueness is required).  
 
Proof of Proposition 0: 
The proof of Proposition 0 comes directly from the strategic form of the extended game (see Figure 
2). Countries’ best responses are such that, if Country 1 anticipates that: 
-  Country 2 play “Early”, it chooses to play “Early” if f1
CN >  f1
F and “Late” if not; 
-  Country 2 play “Late”, it always chooses to play “Early” as f1
L > f1
CN by assumption. 
Idem for Country 2, if it anticipates that: 
-  Country 1 play “Early”, it chooses to play “Early” if f2
CN >  f2
F and “Late” if not; 
-  Country 1 play “Late”, it always chooses to play “Early” as f2
L > f2
CN by assumption. 
Combining countries’ best responses leads to the conclusions of Proposition 0. ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 1: 
Strategy sets are compact subsets of the real and such that Xi = [0, Ki], i = 1, 2. As benefit and 
damage  functions  are  continuous,  both  countries’  payoff  functions  are  continuous  in  their  own 
strategy.  Then  if  damage  functions  are  strictly  convex,  payoff  functions  have  strictly  decreasing 
differences in (x, y): 
2 , 1 ), ( ) ( ) , ( = ∀ + − = i y x D x B y x f i i i ,   
and:        2 , 1 , 0 ) (
) , (
2
= ∀ < + ′ ′ − =
∂ ∂
∂




i .  
Under these conditions, any selection of a country’s best response correspondence is non increasing in 
the strategy of the other country: for Country 1,  ) , ( max arg ) ( 1 1 1 y x f y br X x∈ =  is non increasing in y, 
while  for  Country  2,  ) , ( max arg ) ( 2 2 2 y x f x br X y∈ =  
is  non  increasing  in  x  (see  Theorem  A.1, 
Topkis, 1978, Appendix A). 
Secondly, the actual strategy set of a country is [0, i Z ], with  i Z  being the emission level a country 
adopts when it’s sole to pollute (i.e. ) 0 ( i i br Z = ). When best responses are monotone decreasing, 
i Z  is also the highest equilibrium emission level a country can choose. 
Reversing the natural order on one country’s emission set, for example Country 2, payoff functions 
then present increasing differences in (x, –y). Under the set of assumptions A1, the two-country global 
emission game is a supermodular game. By Theorems A.2 (Topkis, 1979) and A.3 (Tarski, 1955) in 
Appendix A, the set C
N is non empty and has a smallest and a largest element. ■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1: 
Under A1, C
N is non empty and extreme selections of the best response correspondence of a country 
are  decreasing in the  emission  level  of the  rival (with  the  natural  order  on the strategy  sets)  by 
Theorem  A.1  (Appendix  A).  Reversing  the  natural  order  on  Country  2’s  strategy  set,  extreme 
selections become increasing, respectively in –y for Country 1 and in x for Country 2. Consequently 
the maximal selection in C
N is  ) , ( y x −  
in the new order or equivalently, ) , ( y x in the natural order.  
The proof that ) , ( y x lies on ) ( 2 ⋅ br is given by contradiction: suppose that ) ( ) , ( 2 ⋅ ∉ br Gr y x and that 
there is a fixed point
N C y x ∈ ′ ′ ) , ( with ) ( ) , ( 2 ⋅ ∈ ′ ′ br Gr y x . It means that y y < ′ or equivalently
) ( ) ' ( 2 2 x br x br < . As with the natural order on the strategy sets,  ) ( 2 ⋅ br is decreasing we find that
x x > ' . Both x x > ' and y y < ′ contradicts the extreme nature of ) , ( y x .  
Finally the fact that ) , ( y x is the least preferred by Country 2 is a direct consequence of Theorem 
A.4 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Under A2, the global emission game is naturally a supermodular game, i.e. countries’ payoff functions 
have strictly increasing differences in (x, y). By Theorem A.2 (Topkis, 1979), best responses are thus 
strictly increasing and by Theorem A.3 (Tarski, 1955), C
N is non empty. ■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: 
Under  A2,  both  countries’  payoff  functions  have  strictly  increasing  differences  in  (x,  y)  and  by 
applying Theorem A.2 (Topkis, 1979), any selection of a country best response is increasing in the 
strategy  of  the  other  country.  For  Country  1, ) , ( max arg ) ( * 1 1 y x f y x X x∈ =  
is  increasing  in  y, 
whereas for Country 2, ) , ( max arg ) ( * 2 2 y x f x y X y∈ = is increasing in x. As the global emission game is 
a game of negative externality, Theorem A.4 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) lets us conclude that the 
smallest element in C
N, i.e. ) , ( y x , is also the Pareto dominant equilibrium; the highest element in C
N, 
i.e. ) , ( y x , is the Pareto dominated equilibrium. The former provides the highest possible equilibrium 
payoff for both countries and the latter the worst equilibrium payoff for both of them. The proof is 21 
 
trivial: let *) *, ( y x and ) , ( y x ′ ′ be two Nash equilibria in pure strategies such that ) , ( *) *, ( y x y x ′ ′ > . 
Then *) *, ( ) *, ( ) , ( y x f y x f y x f ≥ ′ ≥ ′ ′ .  The  first  inequality  is  due  to  the  fact  that ) , ( y x ′ ′ is  an 
equilibrium and the second inequality is because f(·) is decreasing in y. Equilibria of the game are thus 
ordered, the smallest being Pareto dominant. ■  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3 aims at characterizing the set of Stackelberg equilibria in the global emission game 
whatever the nature of interactions between countries. The proof relies on the assumptions on the 
benefit  and  damage  functions,  the  latter  defining  the  properties  of  the  follower’s  best  response 
correspondence on which lies the Stackelberg equilibrium. We thus consider respectively each set of 
assumptions A1 and A2. Under A1 or A2, continuity of payoff functions in countries’ own strategy 
insures that the follower’s best response correspondence has a closed graph. In what follows, we 
assume that Country 1 acts as a leader and Country 2 as a follower. Consequently Country 2’s best 
response correspondence has a lowest element ) ( 2 ⋅ br  and we aim at showing that any Stackelberg 
equilibrium lies on this minimal reaction curve. 
 
i)  Under A1, the minimal reaction curve  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is at least lower semi-continuous and right-
continuous.  Yet,  a  strictly  decreasing  reaction  curve,  if  discontinuous,  can  only  jump  down.  By 
contradiction, suppose that there is a Stackelberg equilibrium ) , (
S S y x such that ) ( ) , ( 2 ⋅ ∉ br GR y x
S S
 
and ) ( 2
S S x br y > . By Corollary 1, any selection of  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is non increasing with the natural order on 
the strategy sets. Hence the (finite) set of points at which  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is not uniquely defined coincides 
with the one at which  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is discontinuous. By the contradiction assumption,  ) ( 2 ⋅ br is multi-valued 
at the point x
S. We can thus find a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that choosing x
S + ε for the leader 
would lead to a unique best reply by the follower that is strictly smaller than y
S. It means that  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  
is single valued at x
S + ε, with  ) ( 2
S S x br y >  as  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is right-continuous. The payoff of the leader is 
then  such  that ) , ( )) ( , ( 1 2 1
S S S S y x f x br x f > + + ε ε as ) , ( 1 y x f is  continuous  in  x  and  strictly 
decreasing in y. But this assertion contradicts the initial statement that  ) , (
S S y x  is a Stackelberg 
equilibrium. It follows that ) ( ) , ( 2 ⋅ ∈ br GR y x
S S and that )) ( , ( max arg 2 1 0 1 x br x f S x≥ = .  
What about the existence of multiple Stackelberg equilibria. If they exist, it’s always relative to
) ( 2 ⋅ br which is a parameter in the payoff function of the leader. Yet, if the leader has to choose 
between several equilibria, he will always adopt the strategy leading to the highest payoff. Therefore 
we can assume the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, with any point in S1 leading to the same 
payoff for the leader.  
Finally, as Country 1’s most preferred Cournot-Nash equilibrium is ) , ( y x with ) ( ) , ( 2 ⋅ ∈ br GR y x , the 
payoff of the leader is at least as high as the one he would obtain at his most preferred equilibrium of 
the simultaneous game. 
 
ii)  Under  A2,  the  minimal  reaction  curve  ) ( 2 ⋅ br   is  at  least  upper  semi-continuous  and  left-
continuous. Yet, a strictly increasing reaction curve, if discontinuous, can only jump up. We adopt the 
same reasoning as before, except that we consider x
S – ε with ε > 0, instead of x
S + ε. This deviation is 
possible  only  if  0 ≠
S x .  Now,  by  contradiction,  suppose  that  there  is  a  Stackelberg  equilibrium
) , (
S S y x such that ) ( ) , ( 2 ⋅ ∉ br GR y x
S S and ) ( 2
S S x br y > . By Corollary 2, any selection of  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is non 
decreasing with the natural order on the strategy sets. Hence the (finite) set of points at which  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  
is not uniquely defined coincides with the one at which  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is discontinuous. By the contradiction 
assumption, ) ( 2 ⋅ br is multi-valued at the point x
S. We can thus find a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that 
choosing x
S – ε for the leader would lead to a unique best reply by the follower that is strictly smaller 
than y
S. It means that  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is single valued at x
S – ε, with  ) ( 2
S S x br y >  as  ) ( 2 ⋅ br  is left-continuous. 22 
 
The  payoff  of  the  leader  is  then  such  that ) , ( )) ( , ( 1 2 1
S S S S y x f x br x f > − − ε ε as ) , ( 1 y x f is 
continuous in x and strictly decreasing in y. But this assertion contradicts the initial statement that
) , (
S S y x is  a  Stackelberg  equilibrium.  It  follows  that ) ( ) , ( 2 ⋅ ∈ br GR y x
S S and  that
)) ( , ( max arg 2 1 0 1 x br x f S x≥ = . 
As for point i) above, we can assume the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium and any point in 
S1 leads to the same payoff for the leader. This payoff is at least as high as the one the leader would 
obtain at his most preferred equilibrium of the simultaneous game. ■ 
   
Lemma B.1: 
Under the set of assumptions A1, if all Cournot-Nash equilibria are interior (i.e. with no emission 
level being 0), then the extreme Cournot-Nash equilibrium ) , ( y x is such that 1 ) , ( S y x ∉ . 
Proof: 
Under A1, a country’s payoff function has strictly decreasing differences in (x, y). Thus x f ∂ ⋅ ∂ / ) (  is 
strictly decreasing in y and each country’s best reply strategies are strictly decreasing. The proof relies 
on  the  interiority  of  the  equilibrium.  By  contradiction,  suppose  that  the  argument  maximum  is 
















Both equalities contradict the statement that  x f ∂ ⋅ ∂ / ) (  is strictly decreasing in y. Hence any selection 
of  ) (⋅ br is strictly decreasing. 
Now we show that Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria never coincide, i.e. that 1 ) , ( S y x ∉ . 
Suppose )) ( , ( 2
S S x br x any Stackelberg equilibrium with Country 1 as leader. As ) , ( y x is interior, it 
is such that 0 / ) , ( = ∂ ∂ x y x f . If  )) ( , ( 2
S S x br x  is interior as well, then we can check the following first 
order condition: 
0 ) (
)) ( , ( )) ( , (
2






S S S S
x r b
y
x br x f
x
x br x f
. 
As 0 ) ( 2 < ⋅ ′ r b and 0 / 1 < ∂ ∂ y f , we conclude that 0




x br x f
S S
. Hence
S x x≠ and ) ( ) ( 2 2
S x br x br ≠ . 
If the Stackelberg equilibrium is not interior, the same conclusion follows as ) , ( y x is necessarily 
interior. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
Given Propositions 1 and 3, C
N, S1 and S2 are non empty. In more by Proposition 3 Country i is better 
off at any point of Si than at any point of C
N. Finally, by Corollary 1,
N C y x ∈ ) , ( where y
 
is Country 
2’s lowest equilibrium emission level and also its worst equilibrium. By Proposition 0, we have still to 
show that a country prefers its worst Cournot-Nash equilibrium to its payoff as a follower. Suppose
) , (
S S y x is the Stackelberg equilibrium with Country 1 as leader and  ) , ( y x  
is its most preferred 
equilibrium when both choose their strategy simultaneously. By Lemma B.1,  ) , ( ) , ( y x y x
S S ≠  
even if 
both lie on  ) ( 2 ⋅ br . By Proposition 3, we know that Country 1 prefers its payoff as a leader to its most 
preferred Cournot-Nash payoff, i.e.:   
) , ( ) , ( 1 1 y x f y x f
S S > . 
By definition of Nash equilibrium, we can also write the following inequality: 
) , ( ) , ( 1 1 y x f y x f
S S S ≥ .            (1) 23 
 
It means that if Country 2 chooses it Cournot-Nash equilibrium strategy, x
S is not a best reply for 
Country 1. As the game is of negative externality ( 0 / ) , ( 1 < ∂ ∂ y y x f ), the inequality (1) lets us 
conclude that y y
S < , or equivalently ) ( ) ( 2 2 x br x br
S < . As ) ( 2 ⋅ br is strictly decreasing, it follows that
x x
S > .  
For the follower, given the order defined on countries’ individual emission levels at the Cournot-
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we find the following inequalities on its equilibrium payoffs: 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 2 y x f y x f y x f
S S S < < .        (2) 
The first inequality in (2) is due to the fact that  x x
S >  and that Country 2’s payoff is decreasing in 
the  strategy  of  the  other  country  (the  game  is  of  negative  externality  and 0 / ) , ( 2 < ∂ ∂ x y x f ).  The 
second inequality is linked to the definition of Nash equilibrium: the payoff of Country 2 is maximum 
when the latter adopts its best response to x . We can conclude that the follower always prefers its 
worst  Cournot-Nash  payoff  of  the  simultaneous  game  rather  than  its  payoff  at  the  Stackelberg 
equilibrium. The proof when Country 2 is leader is the same and relies on the equilibrium ) , ( y x . By 
Proposition 0, the conditions studied here are the one under which the set of equilibria of the extended 
global emission game is { }
N C e e E ), , ( =  . ■ 
 
Lemma B.2: 
Under the set of assumptions A2, if all Cournot-Nash equilibria are interior, then they never coincide 
with the Stackelberg equilibria; in particular 1 ) , ( S y x ∉ .  
  Proof: 
The proof of Lemma B.2 is identical to the one of Lemma B.1 except that, under A2, a country’s 
payoff function has strictly increasing differences in (x, y). Thus x f ∂ ⋅ ∂ / ) ( is strictly increasing in y 
and each country’s best reply strategies are strictly increasing. As previously, the proof relies on the 
interiority of the equilibrium. By contradiction, suppose that the argument maximum is constant, i.e.
















Both equalities contradict the statement that x f ∂ ⋅ ∂ / ) ( is strictly increasing in y. Hence any selection 
of  ) (⋅ br is strictly increasing. The proof that Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria never coincide 
is the same as for Lemma B.1. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Under A2, the global emission game is supermodular with the natural order on the strategy sets; 
countries’ best responses are non decreasing. By Theorem A.4 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), the 
Pareto  dominant  equilibrium  is  the  one  with  the  lowest  emission  levels  for  both  countries:
N C y x ∈ ) , ( . Moreover we know that a country i is better off at any point of Si (i.e. as a leader) than 
at any point of C
N (Proposition 3). By Proposition 0, we have to establish that a country always 
prefers its payoff as a follower to any other payoff resulting from the simultaneous game. To do so, 
consider ) , (
S S y x as any Stackelberg equilibrium with Country 1 as leader. By Lemma B.2, we know 
that
N S S C y x ∉ ) , ( . Moreover, by Proposition 3, Country 1 always prefers its payoff as a leader to any 
other payoff of the simultaneous game, and in particular to its most preferred Cournot-Nash payoff 
i.e.: 
) , ( ) , ( 1 1 y x f y x f
S S > .           
Another  inequality  follows  from  the  definition  of  Nash  equilibrium:  if  Country  2  chooses  its 
equilibrium strategy of the simultaneous game, x
S is not a best response for Country 1. Then: 
) , ( ) , ( 1 1 y x f y x f
S S S ≥ .             (3) 24 
 
As the game is of negative externality ( 0 / ) , ( 1 < ∂ ∂ y y x f ), inequality (3) lets us conclude that y y
S < , or 
equivalently ) ( ) ( 2 2 x br x br
S < . As ) ( 2 ⋅ br is strictly increasing by Lemma B.2, it follows that x x
S < . 
For the follower, given the order defined on countries’ individual emission levels at the Cournot-
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we find the following inequalities on its equilibrium payoffs: 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 2
S S S y x f y x f y x f < < .        (4) 
The first inequality of (4) is due to the fact that x x
S <  and that Country 2’s payoff is decreasing in 
the strategy of the other country (the game is of negative externality and 0 / ) , ( 2 < ∂ ∂ x y x f ).The second 
inequality is linked to the definition of Nash equilibrium: Country 2’s payoff is maximum when it 
adopts  its  best  response  to  x
S.  We  conclude  that  the  leader  and  the  follower  always  prefer  their 
respective payoff at the Stackelberg equilibrium than their most preferred Cournot-Nash payoff of the 
simultaneous game. By Proposition 0, the conditions studied here are the one under which the set of 
equilibria of the extended global emission game is { } { } 2 1 ), , ( ), , ( S p s S s p E ∪ = . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
Proposition 0 leads to a particular sequence of moves in the extended global emission game if: i) a 
country i is better off at any point of Si than at any point of C
N; ii) Country 1 is better off at its least 
preferred equilibrium in C
N than at any point in S2, whereas Country 2 is better off at any point in S2 
than at any point in C
N. Whatever the set of assumptions A1 or A2, point i) is true by Lemma B.1. 
Preferences in point ii) can only be established if C
N is non empty: to use Lemma B.1 and B.2, we 
have to assume the existence of an interior equilibrium in the simultaneous move game.  
Under A1, Country 1’s payoff function presents strictly decreasing differences and by Lemma B.1, 
any selection of  ) ( 1 ⋅ br is thus strictly decreasing. Similarly, under A2, Country 2’s payoff function 
presents strictly increasing differences and by Lemma B.2, any selection of  ) ( 2 ⋅ br is thus strictly 
increasing.  Given  the  monotony  of  best  responses  for  both  countries  and  their  direction,  if  an 
equilibrium  exists,  it  is  necessarily  unique.  Call  it *) *, ( y x .  Then  the  proof  of  Proposition  6  is 
identical to the ones of Propositions 4 and 5. Note  ) , (
1 1 y x the Stackelberg equilibrium with Country 
1 as leader. By Proposition 3 and the definition of Nash equilibrium, we can write the two following 
inequalities: 
*) *, ( ) , ( 1
1 1




1 y x f y x f ≥ . 
The game being of negative externality, we deduce that * *) ( ) ( 2
1
2
1 y x br x br y = < = . As ) ( 2 ⋅ br
is strictly increasing, it follows that *
1 x x < . Finally for the follower, the inequalities are such that 
(the reasoning is the same as for relation (4)): 




2 2 y x f y x f y x f < < . 
It means that Country 2 prefers its payoff as a follower at the Stackelberg equilibrium to its payoff at 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  
To show that Country 1 prefers its Cournot-Nash payoff to its Stackelberg payoff as follower, we 
proceed as for the proof of Proposition 4. Suppose ) , (
2 2 y x the Stackelberg equilibrium with Country 
2 as leader, such that the two following inequalities are true: 
*) *, ( ) , ( 2
2 2




2 y x f y x f ≥ . 
As  countries’  payoffs  are  decreasing  in  the  strategy  of  the  other  (game  of  negative  externality),
* *) ( ) ( 1
2
1
2 y x br x br y = < = . As ) ( 1 ⋅ br is strictly decreasing, we deduce that *
2 x x > . It follows for 
the follower that (the reasoning is the same as for relation (2)): 




1 y x f y x f y x f < < . 
Meaning  that Country  1  always  prefers its  payoff  at  the Cournot-Nash  equilibrium to the  one it 
obtains at the Stackelberg equilibrium as follower. 
To conclude, under the assumptions of Proposition 6, the unique SPE of the extended game is such 
that Country 1 (with strategic substitutability) plays as a leader, whereas Country 2 (with strategic 
complementarities) plays as a follower. ■ 25 
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